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IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN THE SALE OF GOODS BY
TRADE NAME
By FRANK L. MECHEm*

T

subject of implied warranties in the law of sales has always
been a troublesome one. This is no less true since the general
adoption of the Uniform Sales Act than it was under the common law, as the inconsistent views in many recent cases, decided
under the act, ably demonstrate. The greatest conflict of opinion
has developed with reference to sales of goods under patent and
trade names, and because that method of marketing has achieved
considerable prominence in recent years, a few suggestions concerning the obligations of implied warranty in those cases seem
justifiable..
HE

1. IMPLIED WARRANTY OF TITLE, FREEDOM FROM
INCUMBRANCES, AND QUIET POSSESSION

Although the common law started with the principle that a
seller did not warrant the title of goods which he sold,' it was
not long until the cases began to recognize that an affirmation of
title by the seller might amount to a warranty,2 and there appears
in Blackstone the statement that "a purchaser of goods and chattels may have a satisfaction from the seller, if he sells them as his
own, and the title proves deficient, without any express warranty
for that purpose." 3 And however much this statement may be
criticized as inaccurate in view of the then existing law of England, it is certain that the subsequent law crystallized in accordance
with it, and the doctrine was generally laid down that, in the or*Professor of Law, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho.
iNoy's Maxims, Ch. 42.
2
Medina v. Stoughton, (1701) 1 Salk. 210.
32 Blackstone, Comm. 451.
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dinary case, a sale of a chattel was a warranty of title in the
seller.4
Some of the early English and American cases sought to make
a distinction in the event the seller was not in possession of the
chattel, contending that a lack of possession by the seller was an
indication of a possible deficiency in the seller's title but many
recent cases are contra by abolishing the distinction, and rightly
so, for if under modern methods of dealing, at least, one purports
to sell goods as his own, he should be held to have warranted his
title whether in possession or out.' In fact, the only exception
to the general principle which can be supported on reason (and it
is more of a limitation than an exception) is that where the seller
does not purport to sell goods as his own, but merely to sell what
interest he may have in them, or is authorized to transfer for another, he does not impliedly warrant his own title or that of the
other.G Where the buyer, in good faith, relies upon an implied
representation of the seller, he should be protected, but only when
such reliance is justifiable under the circumstances.
These views have received the sanction of the Sales Act,' and,
in addition, it has also provided for implied warranties of freedom
from incumbrances, and quiet enjoyment, upon the same basis as
the implied warranty of title, following the precedent of a group
of well-reasoned common law decisions. Neither the act nor the
cases applying it make any exception in favor of the seller of
specified articles under a trade name and on principle it is obvious
that there should be none.
2.

IMPLIED WARRANTY

OF MERCIIANTABILITY

Whether an implied warranty of merchantability attaches to
a sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade name,
is a problem of greater difficulty. Much of the difficulty seems
to arise out of a confusion as to the exact scope and meaning of
the term "merchantability" as applied to a sale of goods. However, since such a discussion is not appropriate here, "merchantability" will be taken as the general equivalent for the expression
that, "the goods shall be reasonably appropriate for the general
4
Eicholz v. Bannister, (1864) 17 C. B. (N.S.) 708; Shattuck v. Green,
(1870) 104 Mass. 42; Burt v. Dewey, (1869) 40 N. Y. 283; Gould v.
Bourgeois, (1889) 51 N. J. L. 361; 23 Eng. Rul. Cases 206. In Minnesota.
Davis v. Smith, (1862) 7 Minn. 414; Jordan v. Van Duzee, (1917) 139
Minn.5 103, 165 N. W. 877.
jordan v. Van Duzee, (1917) 139 Minn. 103, 165 N. W. 877.
6
Johnson v. Laybourn, (1894) 56 Minn. 332, 57 N. W. 933.
7Sec. 13.
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This is the defi-

Where there is a sale of a specified article under its patent
or other trade name, does the seller impliedly warrant that the
article shall be reasonably appropriate for the general purpose for
which it is produced and sold? The first impulse is to answer
in the affirmative. Good conscience and fair dealing would seem
to dictate it. But when a sound legal foundation is sought for
this.principle, additional considerations must be disposed of. If
resort is had to the cases for assistance, it appears that all implied
warranties of quality, like implied warranties of title, were unknown to the early law. It proceeded upon the theory that a
purchaser of chattels ordinarily relied solely upon his own knowledge and judgment concerning their quality, and applied the maxim caveat emptor indiscriminately where the purchaser failed to
require an express warranty. That the principle of caveat emptor
should be applied to some situations in the law of sales may be
admitted, and if the situation in-the early law was always that
assumed by the courts, i.e., that the buyer relied upon his own
judgment, then we can have no objection to their application of
it. But this may be doubted. At any rate it is certain that the
development and expansion of trade and industry resulted in an
ever increasing reliance by the buyer upon the knowledge, skill
and judgment of the seller and economic pressure encouraged it
as a necessary adjunct to the extension of business relations. Under such circumstances the unqualified principle of. caveat emptor
was bound to fall and so the courts began to limit its application
to those whose situation where the buyer, in fact, either did, or
should have relied on his own judgment of the quality of the
goods, and setting up an obligation of implied warranty against the
seller when the buyer placed a reasonable reliance in the seller's
judgment. Thus the doctrine of implied warranties of quality
was established in the law of sales. 9
The courts, however, quickly made this distinction,-that since
the obligation of the seller upon an implied warranty of quality
was directly dependent upon the reasonable reliance of the buyer,
irrespective of contract, and since the nature and extent of the
buyer's reliance might vary, so might that of the seller's obligav. Shaghalian, (1923) 244 Mass. 19, 138 N. E. 236.
SParker
9
Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Campb. 144; Laing v. Fidgeon, (1815)
4 Campb. 169.
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tion. The buyer in making a purchase might rely wholly upon
the seller to supply him with goods suitable for a particular purpose, making such purpose known to the seller, or, he might rely
upon the seller only to furnish goods of a particular kind or
class, exercising his own skill and judgment as to their fitness
for a particular purpose. In the first instance the seller, unless
he expressed a clear unwillingness at or before the time of the
sale, was held to have assumed the responsibility of delivering
goods which would reasonably suit the particular purpose made
known by the buyer and this obligation was called an implied
warranty of fitness, while in the second, the seller was only held
to the obligation of delivering goods reasonably appropriate for
the general purpose for which they were produced and sold, being
the iliplied warranty of merchantability. 1°
Experience has long since proven the practical as well as theoretical soundness of this doctrine and it is now well established,
although a few recent decisions may be found which prefer to follow the ancient rule of caveat emptor in such cases. Moreover,
it is generally held that the obligation of the seller attaches even
though the buyer is given an opportunity to inspect the goods, if
such an inspection will not ordinarily, and in the particular instance does not, reveal the defect.1" There also, the buyer may
justifiably rely upon the judgment of the seller, and if he does so,
he should be protected.
Of the two implied warranties of quality, that of merchantability is the most common, and the less severe, from the standpoint of the seller. May there be sales of specified articles under
patent or other trade names to which this warranty is applicable
and where it should be imposed? An examination of the common law reports on this point is not very encouraging. In cases
like Jones v. Just' 2 and Gardiner v. Gray," there are recognitions

of an implied warranty of merchantability, under certain circumstances, in the sale of "known, described, and definite articles,"
but in none is the discussion extended to the situation mentioned
in the Sales Act, 4 -a sale of specified goods by patent or trade
name. Nor is the act self-explanatory, since it only mentions the
'Ojones v. Just, (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 197.
"Priest v. Last, [1903] 2 K. B. 148; Ungerer v. Louis Maull Cheese
Co., (1911) 155 Mo. App. 95, 134 S. W. 56.
12(1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 197.
13(1815)
4 Campb. 144.
14 Sec. 15 (4).
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implied warranty of merchantability in reference to a sale by description. Is it to be presumed then, that such a sale, or contract
to sell, brings about a situation to which the implied warranty
of merchantability was not applicable at common law, or if not,
that the act has changed the law in that respect?
There is ample authority tending to rebut either inference.
While the common law decisions did not mention sales under
patent or trade names, yet they did deal with an analogous situation. Beginning with Gardiner v. Gray,1" the rule was broadly
stated that in a sale of "known, described, and definite articles,"
or "specified goods," the seller impliedly warranted their merchantability where the contract was not inconsistent therewith, and
where the buyer, by reason of a lack of knowledge of the quality
of the goods, or, an opportunity for their inspection which should
have revealed the defect, reasonably relied on the seller's judgment. It was said that although the buyer relied only upon his
own judgment in selecting the type of article he wanted, nevertheless he did rely upon the seller in reference to its genral qualities and that therefore the seller must assume the risk of deficiency. The propriety of this rule was usually supported by the
facts of the cases in which it was applied. Gardiner v. Gray
may be taken as an illustration. There the defendant struck a
bargain with the plaintiff for the purchase of twelve specified
bales of "waste-silk" imported by the plaintiff and then lying in
dock, not having been unloaded. When delivered, the silk proved
to be unmerchantable and the defendant set up this fact by way
of defense, when sued for the purchase price, alleging breach
of an implied warranty of merchantability. In allowing this defense, the Court said:
"I am of opinion, however. that under such circumstances, the
purchaser has a right to expect a salable article answering tLie
description in the contract. Without any particular warranty,
this is an implied term in every contract . . . The question then
is, whether the commodity purchased by the plaintiff be of such
a quality as can be reasonably brought into the market to be sold as
waste-silk."
This decision was followed by a large number of common
law cases dealing with sales of known, described and definite articles, in many of which the articles were sold under trade name,
and it was consistently held that where the trade name was employed only as a designation of the kind of article wanted, an
25(1815) 4 Campb. 144.
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implied warranty of merchantability should be imposed, where the
buyer had apparently relied upon the judgment of the seller as
to quality. If, however, the trade name, or other denominator of
kind, was also intended as a designation of particular quality, and
goods of exactly that quality were delivered, no warranty of
merchantability was implied, since there was no reliance of the
buyer upon the seller from which one might be inferred."'
Therefore, on principle, it seems that in a proper case (1)
Where the trade name is employed in the contract as descriptive
of the kind or class of goods to be delivered; (2) where the buyer
relies upon the judgment of the seller as to quality, an implied
warranty of merchantability should be included as one of the
seller's obligations.
If the foregoing may be accepted as a correct statement of the
common law principles upon this subject, all doubt as to the proper
interpretation of the appropriate Sales Act provisions"7 should
be dispelled, and it may be said with confidence that the act also
provides for an implied warranty of merchantable quality in similar cases. For this there is ample verification in the history of the
act. Its proponents avowedly intended to follow the English
Sales of Goods Act, which in turn purported to adopt the desirable
principles of the common law, thus incorporating by inference, at
least, the rule of warranty just stated."8 But it is not necessary
to rely solely upon that fact, preponderant as it is, since the Sales
Act itself contains the most cogent evidence of legal authority to
support the assumption. Section 15 of the act containing the law
applicable to implied warranties of quality, reads as follows:
16In the following cases it was held accordingly: Gorby v. Bridgeman,

(1919) 83 W. Va. 727, 99 S. E. 88; Guyandotte Coal Co. v. Virginian E. &
M. Works, (1923) 94 W. Va. 300, 118 S. E. 512; Franklin Motor Car
Co. v. Ratliff, (1922) 207 Ala. 341, 92 So. 449; Harvey v. Buick Motor
Co., (1915) 177 S. W. 774; Little v. G. E. Van Syckle & Co., (1898) 115
Mich. 480, 73 N. W. 554; Kaull v. Blacker, (1920) 107 Kan. 578, 193 Pac.
182; Rice v. Friend Bros. Co., (1917) 179 Ia. 355, 161 N. W. 310; G. M. C.
Truck Co. v. Kelley, (1924) 105 Okla. 84, 231 Pac. 882. And see other
cases collected in 21 A. L. R. 367. The Minnesota cases were clearly in
harmony with this view. In Goulds v. Brophy, (1889) 42 Minn. 109, 43

N. W. 834, it is said: "Here the defendant simply ordered a specific

article of a known, recognized and defined make or description, which was
manufactured by the plaintiffs, and in the market. There was an implied

warranty-or, more correctly speaking, condition of the contract-that it
should conform to the description and be of good material and workmanship, according to that description, but none that it would answer the
purpose described or supposed." See also, Cosgrove v. Bennett, (1884)
32 Minn. 371, 20 N. W. 359; Anderson -v. Van Doren, (1919) 142 Minn.
237, 172 N. W. 117.
17Sec. 15.
IsWilliston, Sales, Sees. 227, 236a.
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"Section 15. (Implied Warranties of Quality.) Subject to
the provisions of this act and of any statute in that behalf, there is
no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for
any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell
or a sale, except as follows:
"(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods
are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or
not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
"(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a seller
who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower
or manufacturer or -not), there is an implied warranty that the
goods shall be of a merchantable quality.
"(3) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied
warranty as regards defects which such examination ought to have
revealed.
"(4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified
article under its patent or other trade name, there is no implied
warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose.
"(5) An implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness
for a particular purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade.
"(6) An express warranty or condition does not negative a
warranty or condition implied under this act unless inconsistent
therewith."
Taken separately, there may be a reasonable doubt concerning
the scope and application of some of these provisions, resulting
in the formulation of some unsound principles. By travelling a
narrow path of reasoning, it is possible to conclude that subsection
2 has no application to the kind of situation discussed in subsection 4, arguing that the act has treated them as entirely different instances, necessarily unrelated, since neither contains any
express mention of the other. The result of this would be to
deny the existence of any implied warranty of quality whenever
specified goods are sold under a trade name, simply because subsection 2 does not specifically refer to such sales whereas subsection 4 does,-the inference being that they are thereby withdrawn from the operation of sub-section 2.
Unfortunately some decisions in this country apparently
have followed this line of reasoning in deciding cases under the
act."9 If followed to a logical conclusion, they will, in all proba19Empire Cream Separator Co. v. Quinn, (1914) 184 App. Div. 302,
171 N. Y. S. 413; Santa Rosa-Vallejo Tanning Co. v. Chas. Kronauer &
Co., (1923) 228 Ill.
App. 236. See also, Ivan§ v. Laury, (1901) 67 N. J. L
153, 50 Atl. 355.
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bility, result in establishing an unfair advantage for the seller
over the innocent buyer who has placed a reasonable reliance in
the seller's judgment as to the merchantable quality of his goods,
since to avoid his normal obligation, the seller need only adopt
and use a trade name. Moreover, under these decisions, he may
avoid the obligation even though the contract of sale be executory,
and the buyer given no actual opportunity to make a test and
inspection of the goods.20
By a more sensible construction of the act, a different result
has been reached. In section 15 there are two essentially different
kinds of provisions, one of general application, the other specific.
The heading to the section states that, except as therein provided,
there is no implied warranty as to the quality or fitness for any
particular purpose, of goods supplied under a contract to sell.
Then follow three provisions of general application. Sub-section
1, in effect provides, that no matter how the goods be sold or who
the seller be, if the buyer expressly or by implication makes known
to the seller the particular purpose for which he is purchasing
the goods, and, for that purpose, the facts disclose a reliance on
the seller's skill or judgment. there is an implied warranty of reasonable fitness for such purpose. It will be noted that the language of this provision is sufficiently broad to cover sales of
specified articles under their patent or other trade names. In
sub-section 2 it is said that where goods are bought by description from one who deals in goods of that description, whether
producer or not, and irrespective of the manner of describing,
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be merchantable.
Again the language is sufficiently broad to cover sales of specified articles under their patent or other trade names when the sale
is by description, and if the act stopped short with these two
provisions it would seem to be an irresistible inference that subsection 2 was intended to apply to trade name sales by description.
Proceeding to a consideration of the other four provisions, it is
obvious that sub-section 3 can have no bearing upon our problem,
which is, whether there may at any time be an implied warranty
of merchantability in a trade name sale. Nor do sub-sections
5 and 6 have any particular effect upon it. There remains only
sub-section 4,-a provision of expressly restricted application
which is painstakingly specific. It says that in the sale of speci2Empire Cream Separator Co. v. Quinn, (1918)
177 N. Y. S. 413.

184 App. Div. 302,
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fled goods under a patent or other trade name, there is no implied
warranty as to their fitness for any particularpurposc, thus qualifying the general application of sub-section 1 in that special instance, but having absolutely no effect upon the general rule of
sub-section 2.
It must be admitted that there is but little judicial authority
for this interpretation of the act. The first case in which it
was mentioned seems to be Bristol Tramnways and Carriage Co.
v. Fiat Motors, Limited,21 decided under the Sales of Goods Act,
from which the substance of section 15 of the Sales Act was derived. In discussing the effect of these provisions, the Court
(Farwell, L. J.) says:
"Further, there is the second exception in section 14, on which
Mr. Justice Lawrance has also found in the plaintiff's favour,
and to this the proviso to the first exception does not apply; the
implied condition that the goods are of merchantable quality applies to all goods bought from a seller who deals in goods of that
description whether they are sold under a patent or a trade name
or otherwise; the only proviso in sub-section 2,-namely, examination by the buyer,--is negatived by Mr. Justice Lawrance's finding of fact in this case. The phrase 'merchantable quality' seems
more appropriate to a retail purchaser buying from a wholesale
firm than to private buyers, and to natural products such as grain,
wool, or flour, than to a complicated machine, but it is clear that it
extends to both; the definition of 'goods' in section 62 makes that
word include 'all chattels personal other than things in action or
money,' and 'quality of goods' include their state or condition.
And this is in accordance with the older cases; for example, in
Laing v. Fidgeon, (1815) it was held that in every contract to
furnish manufactured goods, however low the price, it is an implied term that the goods shall be merchantable..... The phrase
in section 14, sub-section 2 is, in my opinion, used as meaning
that the article is of such quality and in such condition that a
reasonable man, acting reasonably, would, after a full examination, accept it under the circumstances of the case in performance
of his offer to buy that article and whether he buys for his own
use or to sell again, so as to make the term 'salable' apply."22
Among the American cases there is one particularly noteworthy supporting opinion. That eminent jurist. Judge Iearned
Hand, writing the decision of the court in McNiel & Higgins Co.
v. Czarnikow-Rienda Co.,23 declares:
"The case, therefore, comes down to whether in a sale of
fungibles a stipulation for a specific brand or make is to be taken
21[1910] 2 K. B. 831.
22
See also: Sumner Permain & Co. v. \¥ebb & Co., [1922] 1 K. B. 55.
23(D.C. N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed. 397.
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as a part of the description of the goods.

It is true that literally

a brand only means that the goods are made by the brand owner,
and it is argued that, if so made the contract is fulfilled. Yet that
argument, when applied to the description proper, would, and for
long did, preclude any implied warranty whatever, because the
assumption in these cases always is that the goods literally conform with the description. The implied warranty is an added
obligation imposed by law. Williston, Contracts, sec. 984. It
seems to me that precisely the same considerations make for a
similar implied warranty touching the brand as touching any part
of the description. Although the goods are actually made by the
owner, unless they be of passing grade for such goods, the buyer
is disappointed in his reasonable reliance. The case can be tested
by the supposed sale of a manufacturer. Assume that, having
a reputation distinguished by his brand, he agrees to sell under
that brand. Presumably the brand means some uniform quality,
which has made it known and desired. The buyer exacts it because he expects the delivery to have that quality. The seller knows
of the buyer's expectations, and he is in a position to know whether
the delivery conforms with those expectations. He knows that the
buyer relies upon his better knowledge to insure their realization.
He cannot suppose that the buyer cares for the fact that he makes
the goods independently of the quality of which that fact assures
him. if he is charged with more than a literal compliance with
any part of the description because of his better information, he
ought, I should say, be charged with this. If not, it can only
be because the brand is taken as signifying nothing in the quality
of the goods, an erroneous understanding of the parties' meaning.
If this be true for a manufacturer, it is under section 96, subd.
2, also true for any seller who deals in the brand.
"I have not been able to find any case exactly in point. Dounce
v. Dow, (1876) 64 N. Y. 411, went off on the question of waiver.
and the court expressly declined to pass upon the question raised
here. In Taylor v. Dalton, (1862) 3 F. & F. 263, a nisi prius rlding of Baron Martin, the case was very closely in point to that
at bar, and the ruling in the present defendant's favor. Still it is
not exactly on all fours with it. In Lindsborg, etc., Co. v. Danzero, (1915) 189 Mo.'App. 154, 161, 174 S. W. 459, 461, there is
a suggestion obiter that the delivery must come tip to 'the standard of its class,' but it cannot be taken even as a dictum to that
effect. Such a dictum occurs in Polly v. Arony, (1918) 172
N. Y. S.305, 306. On the other hand in Beck v. Sheldon, (1872)
48 N. Y. 365, the case was of a sale made by a manufacturer of
pig iron to be made at his furnaces, and of No. 1 and No. 2 grade.
The buyer asserted that it was not as good as those grades made
elsewhere or in earlier years by the seller. The court said, though
obiter, that the contract was satisfied by the product of the sellers'
furnaces of that grade, regardless of whether it was merchantable or equal to the earlier product. Earl, C., declined to pass
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upon this point. On the whole, therefore, the cases appear to
me to be ambiguous, and none of them except Polly v. Arony,
(1918) 172 N. Y. S. 305, since the statute. The point seems to be
open on principle.
" Subdivision 4 has dearly nothing to do with the question;
it touches only the warranty of fitness defined in subdivision 1,
and that, too, when the sale is of a 'specified' article. The warranty here is of merchantability, and the two are not to be confused. Where the buyer specifies what he wants, he can, of
course, not rely upon any superior knowledge of the seller that
it will serve his purposes. If he did, lie must give the seller some
latitude of selection. But he may still insist that it must be of
a quality which will pass in the market under that description,
and he may rightly rely upon the seller to secure him such a

quality."
If these cases correctly construe the statute, and it is believed
that they do, the result is quite in harmony with the doctrine of
the common law, and the same result must follow in every case of
a sale of specified articles under a trade name, where the actual
bargain is' made by description, even though the articles are in
the presence of the parties, and after an examination of them,
when suc*h examination could not reasonably be expected to reveal
24
the defects.

3.

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FrrTNss

There is no implied warranty of fitness for any particular
purpose in the sale of a specified article under its patent or trade
name. The usual distinction between implied warranties of
merchantability and implied warranties of fitness for a particular
purpose have already been noticed. An exception to this will be
dealt with hereafter. The important point to be remembered at
present is that the implied warranty of fitness, like all other implied warranties, depended, at common law, upon the buyer's
justifiable reliance in the skill and judgment of the seller. Accordingly, the reports are replete with decisions which, in effect,
hold that there can be no implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose when the contract is for a known, described, definite article, because it would be a contradiction in terms to say
that the seller is bound to deliver a particular and described article
chosen by the buyer and at the same time exercise his own judgment as to its suitability for some special purpose. In such cases
24Polly v. Arony, (1918) 172 N. Y. S. 305; Flaherty v. Maine Motor
Co., (1918) "117 Me. 376, 104 Atl. 627; Kansas City Bolt Co. v. Rodd,
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1915) 220 Fed. 750, 136 C. C. A. 356; Keenan v. Cherry
& Webb, (R. L 1925) 131 AtL 309; Patterson Co. v. Det. Stove Works,
(1925) 230 Mich. 518, 202 N. W. 957.
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there can be no justifiable reliance in the seller's judgment, and
that is true even though the particular purpose of the buyer is
made known to him, since such information, unless amounting to
an enforceable modification of the original contract, has no legal
effect upon the seller's duty thereunder. This being the well settled and logically sound rule of the common law, and the Sales Act
having therefore intended to exactly restate it, no theoretical obstacles are presented why its pertinent provisions should not be
5
so interpreted.

2

But a practical difficulty has been suggested in sonic quarters.
Occasionally it is asserted that the provisions of the Act have
modified the law by narrowing the restrictions upon implied warranties of fitness to situations where specified articles are sold under a patent or trade name, and that the Act has to some extent,
therefore, abandoned the rule of justifiable reliance as the basis
of implied warranties. In support of this, it is said that under
the Act there may be sales of known, described, definite articles.
to which an implied warranty of fitness will attach, provided
those articles have no patent or other trade name. That is wrong.
Clearly, there was no intention that these provisions of the act
(section 15) should change the law, for, be the appearances what
they may, the draftsmen of both acts, Judge Chalmers of the English act. ' and Professor Williston of the American,2" and all
cases in which the question has arisen, "8 consider these provisions
as a restatement of the rule in regard to known, described, definite
articles. Nor, upon a proper construction of the acts, can it be
25
Holt v. Sims, (1905) 94 Minn. 157, 102 N. W. 386: "But it is insisted
on the part of defendants that there was an implied warranty that the
plant, when installed, would comfortably heat the other rooms in the
building when placed; or, in other words, would answer the intended
purpose of defendants in purchasing the same. We are very clear that
under the terms of the contract that no such implied warranty can be
inferred or impressed upon its terms. The plants to be furnished were
known to the defendants; their purposes were understood; their capacity
for heating was open for investigation, which was presumably made by
the purchaser; and it is nowhere disputed that such plants did in fact possess heating capacity, although not satisfactory to the desires and expectations of defendants. Under such circumstances it cannot be held that the
sale of a heating apparatus to be placed in a building necessarily implied
that it will heat such structure to any certain degree of temperature or soi
as to render it sufficient in that respect." And see La Crosse Plow Co. v.
Brooks, (1910) 142 Wis. 640, 126 N. W. 3; Pullman Car Co. v. Metropolitan Ry., (1895) 157 U. S. 94, 15 Sup. Ct. 503, 39 L. Ed. 632; Davis Calyx
Drill2 Co. v. Mallory, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1905) 137 Fed. 33.
(Chalmers, Sales of Goods 45.
2-Williston, Sales, 227, 236a.
28
Matteson v. Lagace, (1914) 36 R. I. 223, 89 Atd. 713; Ohio Electric
Co. v. Light Co., (1915) 161 Wis. 632, 155 N. W. 112. Spaulding & Kimball Co. v. Aetna Chemical Co., (1924) 98 Vt. 169, 126 Atd. 582.
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asserted that they do actually change the law. The true construction is perhaps more readily indicated by the apt phraseology of
the English act. It reads:
"14.

Subject to the provisions of this act . . . there is no

implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any
particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale, except as follows:
"(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods
are required, so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill and judgment, and the goods are of a description which it
is in the scope of the seller's business to supply (whether he be
the manufacturer or not) there is an implied condition that the
goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose, provided that in
the case of a contract for the sale of a specified article under its
patent or other trade name, there is no implied condition as to its
fitness for any particular purpose."
Thus, the trade name proviso becomes an additional limitation to the operation of the sub-section proper. In effect it raises
a conclusive presumption of the buyer's self-reliance in such cases,
but obviously has nothing to do with other situations. Therefore,
a sale of a known, described, definite article will fall within the
operation of the other limitations to the sub-section and the benefit
of an implied warranty of fitness will be denied the buyer, because,
although he may make a particular use known to the seller, it cannot be fairly said that he relies on the seller's judgment in that
respect. The American Sales Act follows the English act with
minor verbal changes in section 15 (1) down to the words "provided that," but makes the proviso a separate sub-section of section 15. Nevertheless, the meaning and relationship remain the
same as in the English act, though the connection is less apparent
at first. This opinion has been expressly sustained in k1a'teso, ,.
La.qacC,2 9 and impliedly in the several cases holding that the English and American acts on this point are identical in effect.
The next question to be determined is, to what class of cases
section 15 (4) of the American act applies,-what is the sale of a
specified article under its patent or other trade name within the
meaning of the Act. Several recent cases are very instructive on
this problem.
In Folsom v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co.,"0 the buyer told
the seller he wanted "a four section Kane gas fired steam boiler
to heat my house." The contract of sale was reduced to writing.
29(1914) 36 R. I. 223, 89 At. 713.
30(1921) 237 Mass. 565, 130 N. E. 197.
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whereby the seller agreed to deliver "a four section Kane gas
fired steam boiler," there being no express stipulations that it
would be suitable for the particular purpose of heating the buyer's
house. The boiler proving unfitted to serve that purpose, the
buyer claimed the benefit of an implied warranty of fitness. But
the Court said:
"The written agreement shows on its face that it is complete
and unambiguous. It cannot be varied or controlled by parol
evidence. It merged all previous negotiations and stipulations
whether oral or written, and cannot be altered by an earlier or
contemporaneous warranty respecting the cost of operation of the
boiler, as the defendant contends . . . If it be assumed in favor

of the defendant but without so deciding that under any circumstances the Sales Act (St. 1908, c. 237) could be held to apply to
the contract in question it nevertheless was for the sale of 'a four
section Kane gas fired steam boiler,' and hence was a sale of a
specified article under its patent or other trade name. As to such
a sale under section 15, clause 4, of the act, there is no implied
warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose."
M4atteson v. Lagace3 was a similar case. The buyer told the
seller he needed a steam heating plant in his skating rink. The
seller recommended one with a "1-5-28-5 section Ideal, sectional
boiler" and a written contract was thereafter made specifying such
a boiler, but containing no express warranty. After installation,
it was found that such a boiler was wholly inefficient to heat the
rink and the buyer relied on an implied warranty of fitness, but
it was held, referring to the Sales Act:
"The boiler, provided for in said contract, the insufficiency of
which appears, without dispute, to have caused the condition complained of by the respondent, was sold under its trade-name,
'1-5-28-5 section Ideal sectional boiler.'
"The question before us is whether the contract between the
parties shall be governed by the paragraph numbered (1) or by
the paragraph numbered (4) in said section. The section of our
statutes referred to appears to have been derived from, and to be
nearly identical in language and legal effect with, similar provisions of the English 'Sales of Goods Act' 1893, 56 and 57 Vict.
c. 71, 14, save that in the English act the paragraph numbered (4)
in our statute appears as a proviso to a paragraph nearly identical
with the paragraph numbered (1) in our statute; the English act
in this particular being as follows: '(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular
purpose for which the goods are required, so as to show that the
buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment, and the goods are
of a description which it is in the course of the seller's business to
31(1914) 36 R. I. 223, 89 AtI. 713.
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supply (whether he be the manufacturer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such
purpose, provided that in the case of a contract for the sale of
a specified article under its patent or other trade name, there is
no implied condition as to its fitness for any particular purpose.'
Under the English act it would be clear that although the respondent here had contracted for the boiler in question to be used for
a particular purpose made known to the petitioner, and had contracted in reliance on the skill and judgment of the petitioner, still
there would be no implied warranty of the fitness of the boiler
for the particular purpose for which it was to be installed.
"The legal effect of these provisions as they are placed in the
Rhode Island statute. so'far as they relate to the circumstances of
the case at bar, are not so 'lain. However, notwithstanding the
language of paragraph (1), we are of the opinion, in view of
the positive and unqualified prohibition of implied warranty contained in the paragraph (4) that paragraph (4), in its bearing on
the case at bar, amounts to a proviso, limiting the provisions of
paragraph (1)."
These cases are fairly representative of the ordinary trade
name sale. In each it does appear that the buyer actually informed the seller of the particular purpose for which the article
was wanted, but that is not necessarily conclusive evidence of the
buyer's reliance upon the seller. It is common practice to inform
a seller of the special purpose for which the kind of article is
to be used, but finally selecting a particular one as best adapted,
in the buyer's judgment, to.that purpose. Whether that is what
happened, in any particular case, is sometimes a very difficult
problem of fact. Where the contract is in writing, as in the
Folsom and the Malteson Cases, a rule of evidence forecloses the
possibility of determining the legal relations of the parties by any
facts inconsistent therewith, and as a result, it is often made to
appear that a justifiable reliance by the buyer has been denied
effect. But the explanation of such an apparent anomaly lies in
the legal limitations of the word "justifiable;" for if the legal
standing of the parties to a sale or contract to sell may be proven
only by the written agreement and facts not inconsistent therewith, and if the agreement specifies an article by its trade name.
without express warranty, then no reliance by the buyer in respect
to fitness for a particular purpose can be "justifiable," since, by
the agreement, the seller cannot exercise his judgment of the fitness of the article'
It would seem to follow that whenever the
transaction is eventually reduced to writing, specifying an article
3

2Spaulding & Kimball Co. v. Aetna Chemical Co., (1924)

126 Atl. 582.

98 Vt. 169,
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under its trade name, and containing no express warranty of fitness, none can be implied. 3
If, however, the contract of sale is entirely oral, and all the
communications of the parties may be taken into consideration, it
frequently becomes a nice question, what kind of sale occurred.
Section 15 (4) of the Act covers only sales under a patent or
trade name. Accordingly, if the sale is upon some other basis,
even though a patent or trade name exists and is used, the problem as to implied warranties of fitness must be solved under section 15 (1). Some cases have recognized this distinction.
In Sachter v. Gulf Refining Co. 4 the buyer, in purchasing
trade-mark oil, relied, not on the trade-mark, but on the seller's
representation that the oil was what the buyer's machinery required; and the court said:
"According to the proof adduced by plaintiff, a representative
of plaintiff was advised by defendant's salesman, when plaintiff
required oil for its refrigerating plant, to order of defendant
Choctaw oil. Thereafter plaintiff's representative stated to Icfendant's manager that defendant's salesman had told plaintiff's
representative that the kind of oil for plaintiff to use was Choctaw
oil, and defendant's manager told plaintiff to order it. It was
accordingly ordered and after being used was found to be unfit
for the purposes required. While the sale of the oil was under a
trade-name, it appears that this was lone at the instance of defendant's salesman, who assured plaintiff's representative of the
fitness of the oil for the purposes required by plaintiff. In cases
of sales of specified articles under a trade-name, where there may
be no implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (section
96. subd. 5, Personal Property Law (as added by laws 1911, c.
571) ). the buyer relies upon the trade-name as his guide of its fitness. Here the buyer relies, not upon the trade-name, but upon
the statement of the seller's representative, which was communicated to defendant's manager. Theretofore subdivision 5 of section 96 of the Personal Property Law does not apply. The examination of plaintiff's plant by defendant's representative, and the
advice given to plaintiff that Choctaw oil was the oil to use, and
the statement by plaintiff's representative to defendant's manager
that defendant's salesman had told plaintiff's representative that
Choctaw oil was the oil to use, and the manager's statement to
plaintiff's representative that plaintiff should order that kind of
oil, indicates that plaintiff made known to defendant the lrpose
for which the oil was required, and that the plaintiff relies on defendant's skill with reference to the use of the oil. Thus there
was an implied warranty that the oil should be reasonably fit for
such purposes. Subdivision 1, sec. 96. Personal Property Law."
33

There seems to be no reason why the application of section 15 (1)
to this situation would not bring about the same result.

34(1923) 203 N. Y. S. 769.
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The decision in Ireland v. Louis K. Liggett Co." went upon
the same point. The plaintiff's intestate went to defendant's store
and asked for a particular kind of cold cream; was informed
by the clerk that defendants did not have it in stock but had
"a cream of their own . . . which was superior to the one
which she had been using" and which was "pure and healthful ;"
relying on his recommendations she purchased the two jars. They
were labelled: "Riker's Violet Cerate for the Complexion. a
Soothing, Healthful Face Cream. Riker Laboratories, Inc., Distributor." The plaintiff, while using the cream, rubbed some of
it in her hand, and a piece of glass contained therein lodged in
her palm. In an action for breach of implied warranty, it was
held:
"The evidence justified the conclusion that the plaintiff at
least by implication made known the particular purpose for which
the goods were required and that in purchasing a preparation
which she had never used before she relied on the seller's skill and
judgment in selecting it.
"The transaction was not as matter of law within the provisions of the statute negativing the existence of an implied warranty of fitness in case of the sale of a specified article. It could
have been found that the plaintiff purchased the preparation upon
the 'recommendation' that it was superior to that which she had
been using and which she desired to purchase and that it was
suitable for use on account of its composition and healthful character. The statutory provision now considered applies where the
transaction results from the desire of one to purchase and the
obligation of another to deliver a definite article having a 'patent
or other trade name.' A seller who reconmmends a specific thing
as fit for the buyer's use, does not bring himself within the help
of this exception, where it can be found that his advice and judgment were relied upon and that the article was not delivered in
fulfillment of the buyer's offer to purchase goods identified by a
name known to the trade and the seller's acceptance thereof. The
existence of such a warranty is not negatived where the purchaser
of an article, for a definite purpose rather than of a particular
kind of merchandise, relies on the seller to supply him with something adapted to that end; the latter in that case does not escape
liability by the recommendation and subsequent sale of an article
having a trade-name. The presence of the glass could have been
found to constitute a breach of an implied warranty that the cream
was reasonably fit for use. Ward v. Great Atlanlic & Pacific Tea
Co., (1918) 231 Mass. 90, 120 N. E. 225, 5 A. L. R. 243."
The result of these cases seems to be to limit the trade namne
proviso, in oral sales, to situations where the buyer makes the
--

35(1922) 243 Mass. 243, 137 N. E.
371.
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initial move by requesting a specified article under its patent or
trade name, thus referring all other situations to section 15 (1) as
a sale not under a patent or trade name.
A recent Illinois case, Neigenfind v. Singer,3" apparently repudiated this distinction. There the buyer entered the seller's
store and ordered a box of "Bull Dog Polish to polish my stove ;"
was told that they had no Bull Dog Polish, but "we have Electric
Polish ;" accepted the latter, which exploded on a cold stove, and
then brought an action on an implied warranty of fitness. The
court held that he could not recover and that no warranty of
quality could be implied under such circumstances because there
was a sale of a specified article under a trade name. It is possible
that the result reached is sound, but the reasoning is seemingly
open to criticism. Certainly, there was no sale under patent or
trade name, but rather, as indicated in the Liggett and Refining
Co. Cases, a sale under the express recommendation of the seller.
The attempted trade name sale was brought to an unsuccessful
conclusion by the seller's statement that he could not supply such
an article. Therefore, the question so far as implied warranty of
fitness is concerned, properly falls under the operation of section
15 (1) and its solution then depends upon the seller's knowledge
of the buyer's particular purpose and the reasonableness of the
buyer's reliance upon the seller's judgment. Applying that test,
it is probably true that the buyer did not rely upon the seller's
judgment as to the special qualities of "Electric Polish," but upon
his own, and accordingly, there should be no implied warranty
of fitness. Nevertheless, the distinction is important and should
not be disregarded, even though, in some cases, it makes no difference in the outcome.
One exception to the general distinction between implied warranties of merchantability and implied warranties of fitness must
now be noticed. It sometimes happens that the distinction is so
far eliminated as to leave no material difference. Considerable
confusion has resulted therefrom. For example, in Stochner &
Pratt, Dodgem Corp. v. GrecnburgI T the buyer purchased an
amusement device known as the "Dodgem," that being its trade
name. The contract was in writing and contained no express
warranty. In an action for the purchase price the buyer answered
that the device showed faulty construction and was constantly out
36(1923) 227 Ill. App. 493.
37(1925) 250 Mass. 550, 146 N. E. 34. Compare Patterson Co. v.
Detroit Stove Works, (1925) 230 Mich. 518, 202 N. W. 957.
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of repair. Evidence upon that point was excluded because it
was said that under Sales Act section 15 (4) there could be no
implied warranty of fitness for any particular purpose. But the
difficulty with this view is that in excluding evidence of breach
of an implied warranty of fitness the court also excludes all evidence of breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, since
here, where the buyer's intended purpose is not different from
the ordinary purpose for which the machine is sold, the two warranties rest upon identical facts. No doubt there was such a sale
under a trade name as to fall within the operation of section 15
(4) and the Massachusetts court rightly excluded the evidence upon that ground but failed to see the possibility of admitting it as
proof of bi-each of implied warranty of merchantability. Under
the latter issue, the gist of the buyer's complaint is that the device
will not serve the ordinary purpose for which it is constructed and
sold, in this case being also the particular purpose for which it
was purchased. In the cases involving sales of unwholesome
food, the same difficulty has been encountered but generally with
more desirable results. 3
The various diversities of interpretation which have here been
pointed out are to be regretted; legislation, so important as the
Uniform Sales Act deserves a better fate, but is not likely to
have it when first principles are disregarded in its application.
3
8Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co.. (1908) 198 Mass. 271, 84 N. E.
481; Rinaldi v. Mlohican Co., (1918) 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 471; Wallis
v. Russell, [1902] 2 Ir. 585.

